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THE LEGAL ETHICS OF SERVANTHOOD
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
The morals of professionals cannot avoid being vicarious. We
act in the nature of things for another person. His ends become our
ends in the process of our acting for him. A pastor advises, per-
forms priestly services for, and prays over his parishioner - all
toward the spiritual health of the parishioner, and in consequence
of the parishioner's desire for spiritual health. The physician prac-
tices his art so that his patient may realize his wish to be healthy; the
mechanic repairs the machine so that the machine will do what the
mechanic's client wants it to do.
The legal profession has exalted its version of this vicarious
morality into the ethics of the professional adversary. A lawyer will
sometimes, in reference to this system, call himself a "hired gun,"
that is, a mercenary - one whose morals are so completely vicar-
ious that he kills one person because a third person wants him to.
In the law as in the clergy the vicarious nature of the vocation
usually involves the professional becoming involved in the moral
choices of his client - and this in a way that may not be as persis-
tently present in other professional relations. One example of this
is the wealthy dowager who decides to disinherit her blameless
children and give her wealth to the Moral Majority. Consider the
professionals who enable her to make that decision: the physician
who delivers her from influenza so that she can turn her attention
to legal business need not concern himself with what she is doing in
her restored health; the mechanic who unfreezes the fuel lines in
her car, so that she can drive to town to see about her will, need not
ask what she will do with the car when it begins to work again. But
her lawyer, unless he really is a hired gun - and few lawyers are -
is likely to ask himself about the will he drafts. He may - many
lawyers would - wonder about the righteousness of the end he is
hired to accomplish. He is apparently not as free as the mercenary
or the physician or the mechanic to say, "It's none of my affair."t
*Thomas L. Shaffer is Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; member
of the Indiana Bar.
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If that is so of lawyers - and it may, in other and rarer
circumstances, be true of physicians and mechanics - it may be
useful to notice that the moral question being asked is, "What is the
client up to?" And that question implies another question: "How is
the client, in his association with me, changing? What is he becom-
ing because of me?" Not only does my professional assistance enable
him to do something; it also enables him to become something. When
I understand that this is so, I may say to myself, my hope is that the
new person will be a better person than the old person was: Pastors
do not point their parishioners toward hell; physicians consider it
immoral to administer lethal drugs, even at the behest of the state
(that is, they do not seek to change their patients from life to death);
lawyers consider it immoral to advise clients on how to become
criminals. We professionals try not to make things worse. My client
will be a different person because of his association with me, as he
will be a different person after any intense association; and to
notice that is to ask, "What do I want him to be?" or, to put that
another way, "What am I up to?" Professional morals, because they
are vicarious, tend to obscure the fundamental moral question -
What am I up to? - and thus professionals find it necessary to
ponder questions of whether to lie, to kill, or to destroy -questions
that would be readily answered if the professional were acting only
for himself.
Such questions are what make professional ethics interesting.
I raise them in order to ask the question I would like mainly to talk
with you about, a consequential question, and that is whether the
ethics-of the New Testament are of any value in discussing profes-
sional morality. Such a question is probably of value to Jews and
Christians; the New Testament is mostly about Jesus of Nazareth
and (1) professionals to whom Jesus is of ultimate importance
might claim to find value for their lives in his life. And (2) the God
tArguments for the adversary ethic in the legal system are not usually arguments
that say, "It's none of my affair;" few lawyers are that callous. These arguments - as
formulated, say, by Professor Monroe Freedman - are that a morality of role is
appropriate for lawyers as advocates, and that the role is necessary because of the
larger welfare of the community or of the state. They are arguments that say a
special morality is justified when a larger good is being served. Thus the lawyer who
uses his skill to suppress evidence against a rapist will not admit that he has taken on
the morals of rape; nor will he argue that rape is none of his affair. He will argue
instead that he is acting in a role in order to serve the state. Some would argue
(Martin Luther, for example) that in serving the state the lawyer is serving his
neighbor.
36 Social Responsibility
of Jesus is the God of Israel. The moral principles of Jesus are the
moral principles of Israel. The question is of value, too, I hope, to
(3) those who are neither Christians norJews. The moral principles
of Jesus have often been of interest and influence in the lives of
non-believers. Nineteenth-century American legal ethics, for ex-
ample, regularly invoked what Judge Sharswood called "the high
and pure morality, which breathes through the Sermon on the
Mount," without implying that to be moral a lawyer would have to
confess the faith of Israel and of the church.
I
Christian notions of service to others were first developed in a
culture that understood and accepted the morality of service, of
doing unto others as one would be done to. Jesus announced that
ancient Jewish moral principle, as his contemporary Rabbi Hillel
did: "You shall treat your neighbor lovingly, for he is like yourself'
(Leviticus 19:18, J. Mackie's translation). That moral principle
supports offering service and then carrying out the service for the
well-being of the person served. This service to another was and is
consequent on serving the God of Israel, a loving God, a God who is
addressed as Father. This God says, "I will make allowances for
them as a man who makes allowances for the son who obeys him.
Then once again you will see the difference between an upright
man and a wicked one, between the one who serves God and the
one who does not serve him" (Malachi 3:17-18, Jerusalem Bible).
Jesus announced this Jewish moral principle of obedient ser-
vice in three ways:
(1) The service Jesus enjoins is pursued to the point of suf-
fering.
(2) The service Jesus enjoins is powerless.
(3) The service Jesus enjoins is given a justification in terms
of its social consequences; that justification is the recon-
ciliation of one person to another.
Taken as a whole, the Christian emphasis points to a professional
morality of servanthood - of being a servant and not merely being
of service. The refinements turn service into servanthood.
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A. Suffering. Jesus said, "Among pagans it is the kings who lord
it over them, and those who have authority over them are given the
title Benefactor. This must not happen with you. No; the greatest
among you must behave as if he were the youngest, the leader as if
he were the one who serves. For who is the greater: the one at table
or the one who serves? The one at table, surely? Yet here am I
among you as one who serves" (Luke 22:24-27, Jerusalem Bible).
Jesus drew on the moral theology of Israel, the morals of obedient
service to God. He also drew specifically on four mysterious songs
from the Book of the Prophet Isaiah; he laid claim, for himself and
his followers, to the image in Judaism of the Servant of the Lord,
the servant who suffers. One of those songs said that the Servant of
the Lord brings justice (Isaiah 42:1-4). One said that this servant
brings "light to the nations ... salvation ... to the ends of the
earth" (Isaiah 49:1-6, Jerusalem Bible). One spoke of the Servant
of the Lord as humiliated in his own generation but finally vindi-
cated by God (Isaiah 50:4-9). And one of them spoke of the servant
as a deviant, one who is made ugly by the touch of God and who
suffers for his deviance:
a thing despised and rejected by men,
a man of sorrows and familiar with suffering,
a man to make people screen their faces;
he was despised and we took no account of him ...
Harshly dealt with, he bore it humbly,
he never opened his mouth,
like a lamb that is led to the slaughterhouse,
like a sheep that is dumb before its shearers
never opening its mouth ...
They gave him a grave with the wicked,
a tomb with the rich,
though he had done no wrong
and there was no perjury in his mouth.
Yahweh has been pleased to crush him with suffering.
If he offers his life in atonement,
he shall see his heirs, he shall have a long life
and through him what Yahweh wishes will be done.
(Isaiah 53:3, 7, 9-10, Jerusalem Bible.)
The Servant of the Lord brings justice to Israel, and salvation
to the other nations. He is, like the prophets, vindicated by God,
but, before vindication, he is (like some of the prophets) despised
and rejected of men - a deviant, a leper. The first Christians made
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dogmatic claims on these songs - most notably the claim that
Jesus's death by torture was resolved, as Isaiah said, in glorification,
in the Resurrection.* The moral point I am making is not that
dogmatic claim, but the claim that Jesus invoked this image of the
suffering servant as a command to his followers. That is the way his
followers are to be - the way Christians are to live with their clients
- not merely to serve them but to be their servants, and to expect to
suffer for it. This is a clear and radical command. It brings to mind
Kierkegaard's melancholy observation: "Remove from Christian-
.ity its ability to shock ... and it is altogether destroyed. It then
becomes a tiny, superficial thing, capable neither of inflicting deep
wounds nor of healing them."
B. Powerless. Jesus announced that a kingdom had come. The
way one belonged to the kingdom that had come was to be power-
less. "Let the children come to me," he said, "and do not stop them;
for it is to such as these that the kingdom of God belongs. I tell you
solemnly, anyone who does not welcome the kingdom of God like a
little child will never enter it" (Luke 18:17, Jerusalem Bible). One
could ponder what it means to welcome anything as a child wel-
comes what happens to him. It does not mean innocence; children
are not innocent. It does not mean simplicity; children are as
complicated as adults are. But being a child does mean being
without power. The kingdom Jesus speaks about is a kingdom one
enters when he is able.to welcome it as one who does not share in
worldly power.
But this absence of power - renunciation of power - is not a
circumstance; it is a choice. And it has a purpose. "The self-
abasement of Christ to powerlessness, to the renunciation of all
obvious marks of distinction, is ... intended to render a service,"
Thielike says (emphasis added). For example, Jesus's refusal to use
power at the behest of Satan (Luke 4:1-4; Mark 4:1-11) serves the
dignity and freedom of men; it shows that what the Father Jesus
speaks of makes women and men subjects through their own free
decision rather than objects of the power of others. When Jesus
performs miracles he uses them to teach with rather than to compel
with or threaten. He seeks powerlessness even when he uses power
*The Jewish tradition, according to Cohon, sees the image in Isaiah as the personi-
fication of Israel, but it is possible to see the Servant of the Lord as also a specific
person (cf. Rowlev, McKenzie) - and this without Christian allusions.
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(as, say, in the curing of the leper, whereby touching the leper he
cures the man's disease but in the process makes a leper of himself;
Mark 1:40-45).
C. Reconciliation. In the Letter to the Hebrews an early Chris-
tan moral theologian says, "Let us keep firm in the hope we
profess, because the one who made the promise is faithful. Let us
be concerned for each other, to stir up a response in love and good
works" (Hebrews 10:23-24, Jerusalem Bible). The Jewish follower
of Jesus here claims his Jewish heritage. Rabbi Hanina bar Hama,
commenting on Proverbs (25:21-22), said, ".... even if the enemy
come to your house to slay you, and he is hungry or thirsty, give him
food and drink; for thereby God will reconcile him to you.. ." (cf.
II Kings 6:21-23). Jesus, when giving directions to his followers on
how they were to resolve their disputes, said, "If your brother does
something wrong, go and have it out with him alone, between your
two selves. If he listens to you, you have won back your brother"
(Matthew 18:15, Jerusalem Bible). The aim of moral life with
clients, according to these texts, is to serve in such a way that the
person served will himself become a servant - that he will himself
be moved to love, to good works, to the company of those who
serve. This is a social ethic; it makes an argument, a consequential,
ethical argument, for these otherwise curious demands for suffer-
ing and for powerlessness. It gives suffering and powerlessness a
social consequence and uses that consequence as a reason for being
a servant. These teachings do not show exactly how reconciliation
will occur; what they say is that it occurs as a consequence of
suffering, powerless servanthood. The teachings do suggest,
though, that one result is the conversion of the person served.
Conversion to what? To suffering and powerlessness. This social ethic
is curious: St. Paul says, "If my blood has to be shed as part of your
own sacrifice and offering - which is your faith - I shall still be
happy and rejoice with all of you and you must bejust as happy and
rejoice with me." He speaks of a fellow believer who has been
persecuted, Epaphroditus, and says, "... . it was for Christ's work
that he came so near to dying." And ofJesus himself, the exemplar,
Paul says:
His state was divine,
Yet he did not cling
to his equality with God
but emptied himself
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to assume the condition of a slave.
(Philippians 2:7, 17, 30; Jerusalem Bible.)
A curious teaching. Karl Barth says of it, ". .. no one is... to be
pitied if he cannot at first belong to this minority, nor to be envied if
he really must."
The moral command or example for professionals is to take
on the servant's task, a task that summons the professional out of
what Karl Barth called an "impossible isolation and concentration
on (self)," that one do that, not in order to be satisfied in his
altruism but in order to make his professional action correspond to
the action ofJesus, who is a suffering servant. In this response one
serves God by being servant to his clients, by being a servant in
suffering, in powerlessness, and in reconciliation. That is the legal
ethics of servanthood. It is apparently the way to be a Christian and
a lawyer. It will no doubt come out about the same way for the
clergy, physicians, and mechanics. It will probably come out in a
similar way for Jews: The theology behind the ethic is specific for
believers, in any case, and it is that the suffering follower contrib-
utes in his obedience to God's action as Creator and Redeemer of
mankind. For Christians the focus of obedience is Jesus as Lord
and Savior; for Jews the focus is a personal identification with and
within Israel as Servant of the Lord.
This leaves open a question on the usefulness of this ethical
teaching for non-believers. Was this radical view of servanthood
useful for, say, the many Americans of Thomas Jefferson's genera-
tion who admired the ethics of the New Testament but would prob-
ably not have been attracted to suffering and powerlessness or to
the notion that God comes into the world through the suffering of
His people? What are the secular arguments for suffering
servanthood?
My colleague Steven Hobbs pointed me in this regard to the
paradoxical Oriental psychology of Lao Tsu, in poetry sometimes
remarkably like Second Isaiah, on the triumph that is in sub-
mission:
One who takes on himself the humiliation
of the state
Is called a ruler worthy of offering
sacrifices to the gods of earth and
millet;
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Is called a king worthy of dominion
over the entire empire.
The way is broad, reaching left as
well as right,
The myriad creatures depend on it
for life yet it claims no authority.
It accomplishes the task yet lays
claim to no merit.
It clothes and feeds the myriad
creatures yet lays no claim
to being their master.
It is because it never attempts
to be great that it succeeds
in becoming great.
From another world, the Scots Calvinist William Barclay argues
thatJesus's notion is a common-sense competitive way to get ahead.
I relay this without endorsement: "It is only the man who will con-
sent to serve more than anyone else who will really rise high," Bar-
clay says. "It is a law of life that service leads to greatness; and that
the higher a man rises the greater the servant he must be... no one
ever loved a man who was always out for himself."
II
The American legal profession has been affected by this radi-
cal legal ethics of servanthood. It is so radical that one might guess
that it would be made trivial among the faithful and ignored by
everybody else, and from those guesses might suppose that noth-
ing would come of it. But you will find in our legal history and in
our lawyer stories more than a trace of the notion that we overcome
evil by suffering the outrage of evil.
Take, for example, the model held up to law students of
Andrew Hamilton, the champion of free speech, who represented
the journalist Zenger before the colonial tyrants of New York, or of
John Adams defending the British soldiers after the Boston Mas-
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sacre, or of the brave Army.lawyers who defended Generals Hom-
ma and Yamashita and in the process defied Douglas MacArthur.
It is possible to claim for such American-lawyer-hero stories, and to
claim seriously, a bit of the powerlessness and suffering and recon-
ciliation of the biblical ideal. And American lawyers in the 18th and
19th centuries thought of it just that way - biblically. David Hoff-
man, the father of American legal ethics, was a formidable Bible
scholar; he was approved of even at Princeton, which was in those
days the defender of the old American Calvinism. Judge George
Sharswood was a Sunday-School teacher; most of those who
formulated the codes of legal ethics of a century ago came from
and returned to the church. If they failed they failed as Christians
and Jews. The movement to purge American professional ethics of
all theology is a recent thing, and its rationale is historically and
thematically shallow.
James William McClendon, a contemporary moral theologian,
does an interesting thing with some of our modern hero stories; he
demonstrates how they are a theology of suffering servanthood.
Martin Luther King, Jr., is one of his examples; Dag Hammar-
skjold is another. Dr. King was the hero and exemplar of the civil
rights movement; Hammarskjold was the model peacemaker.
King was also a Baptist preacher; he came from, returned to -
never left - the Southern black church. His life was a theology of
exodus and atonement; the images of his leadership (those he fol-
lowed and those he left to us) are the images of the servant who
overcomes evil by suffering it, who is powerless, who kneels in the
street and prays for his persecutors. Hammarskjold, the man of
peace, is seen in his diary as a follower of the Cross and not as the
practitioner of peaceful co-existence that he seemed to be at the
United Nations - another powerless sufferer whose life was a
theology of reconciliation.
So, too, of lawyer heroes - Thomas More, for example, or my
favorite of them all, Atticus Finch, of the Maycomb, Alabama, Bar,
hero of To Kill a Mockingbird. Miss Maudie says, in reference to
Atticus's defense of Tom Robinson, that the Christians of
Maycomb had Atticus go for them. Go where? To the Cross. There
Atticus and, even more, his innocent client suffer. There Atticus is
the white church, gathered with Rev. Sykes and the black church,
gathered in reconciliation at the Cross. The courtroom is the Cross,
the Cross showing what men do to one another in the name of the
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law. The agony of Southern Christianity is in that story, and it is the
recent story of an American lawyer.
III
Professional morals, then, are vicarious. That is implicit in any
professional's undertaking to be of service. Biblical professional
morals are, as well, the morals of those who serve God. The God of
Jews and Christians is a loving Father who serves people and whose
command is that his servants serve people, too, and serve them in a
specific and radical way - in suffering, in powerlessness, toward
reconciliation. This command has continuing influence in profes-
sional ethics in America, which, depending on how you look at it,
may prove either that we are more theological than we thought we
were, or that the Holy Spirit is remarkably persistent.
What I have to try to do in conclusion is to connect this moral
theology with the basic question in professional ethics: What do I
wish for my client? That is the professional version of the basic
moral question for anybody: What am I up to?
I have often thought that I could talk about the question of
what I am up to as the professional in professional relationships,
which is also the question of what I hope for my client, in terms of
three alternatives:
(1) I hope that my client will be free; what I seek for him will
be realized when he can choose for himself; or
(2) I hope that my client will be right; what I seek for him will
be realized when, looking at his act, I can see that he did
the right thing; or
(3) 1 hope that my client will be good; what I seek for him will
be realized when he develops and rejoices in his own
moral qualities, when he becomes virtuous.
These answers now seem to me to be too much like moral rules and
too little like the Jesus who said that the Sabbath is made for man,
not man for the Sabbath. Perhaps we could say that the moral ideal
that is unique in the New Testament is not a matter of rules but a
matter of how to live with rules. Whether that is right or not, the
Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath. Rules and mor-
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al dilemmas are subordinated: Servanthood, in suffering and
powerlessness and toward reconciliation, approaches the other not
as the occasion of my own moral choice but as one who is cherished.
First he is cherished and then he is a moral dilemma. He is cherished
whether he is a moral dilemma for me or not.
It is even starker than that. The other - say, client - is cher-
ished, but not as an equal. He is cherished as a superior, as my
master, as the boss. First he is cherished and then, if he becomes a
moral dilemma for me, he is given the benefit of the doubt. If we
disagree, he is probably right. Bosses are entitled to the benefit of
the doubt. Servanthood is, in St. Luke's Gospel, a literal notion.
The Greek word Luke uses to render Jesus's meaning is the word
for a table servant - "waitress" might be a modern English equiva-
lent. St. Paul uses "slave" to express the idea to the Greeks. The
New Testament writers thought that Jesus meant for his teaching
on servanthood to be taken literally. Notice, for example, that St.
John's Gospel focuses the events leading to the Cross and Resurrec-
tion on Jesus washing the feet of his companions.
The legal ethics of servanthood will therefore balance my
hope that my client will be free against the command that my serv-
ing him will reconcile, that he will be restored to his brothers and
sisters and be stirred up to love and good works. His destiny is,
certainly, to be free, but that is so that he can choose to be recon-
ciled to others and so that he can be liberated, in suffering and
without power. My hope for him, in his freedom, is like my hope
for myself, in my freedom.
In this way of looking at things, I hope, too, that my client will
choose what is right. In his freedom, I hope, he will see clearly and
choose bravely and end up doing the right thing. But my servant-
hood is, asJesus's was, the renunciation of power- and this means,
in professional relations, the renunciation of all of the clout that
professionals in our culture have - the power of special knowl-
edge, the status, the paternalism I am seduced into because my
client seems to be dependent on me. I am not his master; he is mine.
I am not his father; we are together brothers of a Lord who wants
us both to be waitresses. If I have power - and heaven knows
lawyers have power in America - it is as a means of servanthood
and a means inferior to love; otherwise I should renounce it, as
Jesus renounced the power to work miracles, lest my power coerce
those whom God wants to be free.
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And, finally, I hope that my client will grow in virtue, will not
only make right choices but will become the sort of person who
makes right choices. I want him to be better than he would have
been if I had not stumbled into his life. But the price of that growth
seems to be suffering - my own, by definition; that is what "com-
passion" means - but also his suffering. That part of servanthood
is so hard for lawyers, so radical, that it is all but unacceptable. Our
training and self-selection is competitive. Our professional
metaphors are to rivalry and are often warlike. We aim to win for
our clients in court and, in the office, to prevent their losing. Our
best moves are assaults, bombshells, forays, frontal attacks, and
rear-guard actions. Everything turns on victory. And so when
Anthony Lewis wants to write a book about poor old Clarence Earl
Gideon's finding a friend in court, he uses a biblical battlefield for
his symbol. Gideon's Trumpet tells of a lawyer who no doubt served
his client but was not his client's servant. I suspect that servanthood
would involve more contact and less victory. Jesus cures the leper,
and becomes a leper in the process. Jesus saves the good thief, but
he does not rescue him from suffering; the good thief does not
come down from the cross until he, too, is dead.
I am grateful for the advice and assistance of Samuel Calhoun, William Geimer,
Stanley Hauerwas, Steven Hobbs, Louis Hodges, and Mary M. Shaffer.
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